摘要
理论上讲我国实施股票期权可以有效解决经理人长期激励不足和经营者道德风险问题,也有利于上市公司降低委托成本,吸引并稳定人才。但由于我国股票市场不完善及股东与管理者的信息不对称等问题的存在,股票期权激励机制在我国的运用效果欠佳,从而产生了激励陷阱。文章通过对股权激励陷阱表现形式及形成原因的分析,提出了规避此类陷阱的具体措施。
Theoretically the stock option implement can be effective to solve the long-term encouragement insufficiency and moral hazard of operators, and it also is propitious to reduce the commission cost for firm came into the market. It attracts and levels off persons with ability. But due to the faultiness of stock market and gerentocratic information asymmetry, the encouragement mechanism about the stock options can't be exerted effectively to bring on the encouragement traps. This paper analyzed representative format and wrought causes about the traps. At last it brings forward some material measures to evade the encouragement traps.
出处
《华东经济管理》
2007年第12期126-128,共3页
East China Economic Management
关键词
股票期权
激励陷阱
道德风险
stock options
encouragement traps
moral hazard