投资者关系管理、现金流权与公司价值——基于中国家族上市公司的实证研究

Investor Relations Management,Cash-Flow Rights and Corporate Value——Empirical Study on Family-Owned Listed Companies in China

本文以2005年中国家族上市公司为样本,研究了金字塔结构控制下投资者关系管理的嵌入效应,尤其是在现金流权和控制权分离的股权结构中,投资者关系管理对现金流权公司价值效应的调节机理。研究发现:我国家族上市公司的现金流权与控制权严重分离,现金流权比例与公司价值显著负相关;投资者关系管理作为上市公司的一项自主性治理机制,与公司价值显著正相关;在投资者关系管理水平较高的家族上市公司中,作为内部人的控股股东的现金流权比例对公司价值的侵占效应会降低。

This paper investigates the embedded effect of investor relations management on corporate value, especially researches how investor relations management affect the cash - flow rights value effects in family - owned listed companies in China. The authors find the separa- tion between cash - flow rights and control rights is severe, corporate value of family - owned listed companies finns in China is negative correlative with cash - flow rights. Otherwise, investor relations management is a self- enforcement mechanism, which is a mechanism of protecting investor rights, and has positive influence on corporate value. In family - owned listed companies, the investor relations management level is higher, the expropriation of cash - flow rights on corporate value is less, and investor relations management can decrease the cash - flow fights valuation effects.