我国宏观调控效果的弱化及其治理

The Weakening of Macro Regulation Effects and the Governance in China

"加大宏观调控,预防经济过热",是我国目前宏观经济的基本政策取向。但在近年来我国宏观调控政策执行过程中,遇到了宏观调控效果弱化的问题。针对这个现象,笔者认为其根源在于我国现行制度下投资型经济增长方式与宏观调控内生的矛盾,而中央对地方政绩单一指标考核形成的委托—代理关系,以及中央和地方政府财权、事权不统一更加剧了这一矛盾。此外,中央在制定宏观调控政策时忽视民众预期,也在一定程度上削弱了宏观调控效果。

At present, China＇ s basic maem economic policy maintains the orientation of ＂strengthening macro regulation and preventing economic overheat＂. However, in recent years, we encounter the weakening effects problem in the implementation of the macro regulation policy. The author holds that the root cause lies in the endogenous conflict between the investment - oriented economic growth pattern and macro regulation in the existing system, which would be aggravated by the principle- agent relationship formed by the unitary index evaluation on the local govemments＇ performance by the central government and by the inconsistence between the two govemment levels in finance and personnel. In addition, when making macro policies, the central government may neglect the expectation of the civilians, so the effects are weakened to some extent.