摘要
运用演化博弈论分析完全信息和不完全信息两种条件下企业员工流失的原因和应采取的策略。在完全信息博弈中,只要博弈的双方知道各个收益参数,就可以根据情况采取行动策略使自身利益最大化;不完全信息的重复博弈中,利用动力学方法定性研究演化博弈均衡的稳定性,只有具备有限理性的企业和员工双方都不断地在边际上对其策略进行调整以使得自身利益最大化,博弈才能最终达到一种动态平衡。
Evolutionary game theory is used to analyze reasons why employees choose to leave their corporations and what strategies they should use under the condition that information is complete or incomplete. In complete information game, as long as each side of the game knows every payoff parameter, they can take action to maximize their own interests according to different conditions ; In incomplete information re- peated game, the stability of evolutionary stable strategy is studied making use of dynamic method, both corporations and employees, who have limited rationality, would adjust their strategies on the marginal constantly to maximize self-interest, the game can achieve a dynamic balance ultimately.
出处
《复杂系统与复杂性科学》
EI
CSCD
2007年第4期78-82,共5页
Complex Systems and Complexity Science
基金
国家自然基金(70401013
70571034)
国家博士后基金(2003033498)
江苏省教育厅基金(03KJD110070)
关键词
演化博弈
动态复制系统
稳定性
员工流失
evolutionary game
dynamical replication system
stability
employees' turnover