中国上市银行独立董事制度的运行效率

The Operating Efficiency of Independent Director System in Chinese Listed Banks

以往的公司治理研究并没有考虑银行业的特殊性,因此对银行的治理问题不能简单地套用以往的研究结论。本文在充分考虑银行业治理的特殊性基础上,通过建立模型实证考察独立董事在银行中的运行效率。研究证实,由于银行股权制衡能力比较强,独立董事的监督职能被弱化,但是银行独立董事由于其专业背景以及广泛的社会关系,能够提高董事会决策效率,促进银行业绩的提升。研究还发现,独立董事的作用是有滞后性的。当期的独立董事能够明显地促进银行下一期的绩效。独立董事制度在国内上市银行中具有效率,能够促进银行的进一步发展。

Previous studies on corporate governance did not consider the particularity in the banking sector, so it is not suitable to simply use the previous study conclusions when analyzing the corporate governance in the banking sector. In view of the particularity in the banking sector, the paper constructs an empirical model to examine the operating efficiency of independent directors in commercial banks. The result reveals that due to the strong power balance amony shareholders, independent directors＇ supervision function is weakened. However, by using their professional backgrounds and extensive social relations, commercial banks＇ independent directors can help to enhance the efficiency in the decislon-making of the board and thus contribute to the improvement of banks＇ performance. The paper also points out that independent directors＇ function is time-lagged： independent directors＇ suggestion in the current period obviously has a positive correlation with the performance in the next period. Therefore, the paper argues that the independent director system is efficient in furthering listed banks＇ growth.