委托代理理论与中国企业家队伍

The Principal-Agtnt Theory and China'sEnterpristr Contingent

本文运用委托代理理论，从新的角度揭示了国有企业改革中的错综关系，阐明了中国企业家队伍难以健康发展和壮大的症结所在；委托人和代理人之间缺乏有效的制衡激励机制与有力的约束机制，在此基础上探讨了中国企业家激励和约束机制的构建。

In this paper the principal-agent theory is applied to reueal from a new angle those intricaterelations existing the reform of the state-run enterprises and to expound the crux of diffieulty inthe deuelopment and growing of China's enterpriser contingent lies in the absence of an effectiveequilibrant mechanism that is, an effectiue encouraging mechanism and forceful restaining one,and accordingly, to wakes a study and discussion on the construction of the both encouraging andrestaining mechanism for China's enterprisers.