农业制度变迁中的政府行为

The Government Behavior in the Changing of Agricultural Policy

1978-2004年间,我国农业政策演变过程证明,诺思界定产权的国家理论对我国改革时期的中央政府行为也有很强的解释力。中央政府的权力必须受到约束,否则,中央政府就会为了自身的眼前利益不断地改变经济交易的规则,从而使这些交易规则对生产者的激励功能减弱。在自上而下的国家授权这一行政制度的保护下,我国基层政府将自身利益最大化目标与完成中央政府下达的任务捆在一起,自发地选择了追求增加自身利益、减少农民利益的种种行为方式。要解决基层政府的这种行为特征,必须改变基层政府的授权方向。

The vicissitudes of agricultural policy from 1978 to 2004 indicate that North＇ s State Theory has its constructional power to analyze the features of the behavior of our central government. In other words, the government＇ s power must be restricted, otherwise, it may change the economic rules whenever it needs and loses the stimulating mechanism vital to producer. Empowered with the superincumbent rights, our local government has to maximize their own interest and at the same time fulfill their mission from the central government. Therefore, the local government chooses to practice a variety of behaviors to increase their interest and to decrease farmers＇ interest. To change the behaviors of local government needs to change the superincumbent rights authorization.