摘要
我国证券市场上股价操纵现象较为普遍,机构投资者盈利丰厚而个人投资者屡屡亏损。以证券市场不规范而机构投资者自身行为发生变异和扭曲为假设前提,将投资者划分为机构投资者与个人投资者,运用博弈论中不完全信息动态博弈的声誉模型对我国证券市场中的机构与个人投资者的交易策略进行分析,对股价操纵现象做出解释。
There is a popular phenomenon of stock prices controlling in China＇ s securities market. Institutional investors have always achieved great earnings while individual investors have always made losses. Taking irregular securities market, institutional investors＇ own varied and distorted behavior as assumption premises, dividing investors into institutional investors and individual investors, this paper has made an analysis on the dealing strategies of institutional investors and individual investors in securities market by utilizing incomplete information dynamic gaming reputation model in gaming theory, giving explanation for stock price -controlling phenomenon.
出处
《河南金融管理干部学院学报》
2007年第6期68-71,共4页
Journal of Henan College of Financial Management Cadres
关键词
证券市场
机构投资者
个人投资者
博弈
声誉模型
Key words： securities market
institutional investor
individual investor
gaming
reputation model
