一种抗阻断攻击的认证组密钥协商协议

An Authenticated Group Key Management Protocol Withstand Interrupted Attack

一个非认证的组密钥协商协议不能对通信参与者和消息进行认证,它必须依赖认证的网络信道或其它的认证方法。分析了Burmester等人在认证广播信道下提出的著名组密钥协商协议,指出它不能抵抗内部恶意节点发起的密钥协商阻断攻击,该攻击导致组内其它诚实节点不能正确计算出一致的组密钥。提出了一种改进的认证的组密钥协商协议,在原协议中加入了消息正确性的认证方法,能够对组内恶意节点进行检测,并在随机预言模型下证明了改进的协议能够抵抗密钥协商阻断攻击。

A non-authenticated group key agreement protocol cannot provide participant and message authentication, thus it must depend on an authenticated network channel or use another scheme to provide authentication. This paper indicates that Burrnester et al. ＇s group key agreement protocol which based on the authenticated broadcast channel is unable to withstand the disruption attack of malicious participants in group. This attack leads that other honest participants will not be able to correctly agree on a group key consistently. In this paper, an improved protocol is proposed. The proposed protocol which joins the message authentication method in original protocol can detect the malicious participant. Under the random oracle model, paper proves the improved protocol can withstand the interrupted attack from malicious participant.