销售商成本信息不对称下的两阶段供应链协调

Coordinating Two-Stage Supply Chain under Asymmetric Retailer's Cost Information

以往的文章研究了由单个供应商和单个销售商组成的供应链协调问题,给出了双方合作时的供应链协调模型,这些都是以信息共享为基础,但是现实中信息不对称使得供应链协调模型的有效性受到了冲击。为避免这种现象的发生,论文在双方合作的基础上建立了供应链双方在需求信息不对称情形下的协调模型。该模型在供应链双方协商分享供应链利润的条件下,运用激励机制使销售商诚实申报成本信息,在实现供应链利润最大化的同时使供应链成员实现双赢。

What is considered in other papers is the coordination problem of a supply chain composed of only a single supplier and retailer. The coordination model is given under the two members＂ cooperation. This is based on symmetric information. Because of asymmetric information, the effectiveness of the coordination model is influenced. Based on such symmetric information, a coordination model under two parties having asymmetric retailer＇s cost information is built. This model is based on that the sup- plier and the tetailer agree on the profit sharing. The supplier and the retailer design an incentive mechanism to prevent the re- tailer from providing false cost information and to increase their profit under optimizing the profit of the supply chain.