摘要
在推行代建制的过程中,信息的不对称不可避免,易引发道德风险,因而在当前相关法规和信用机制都不健全的情况下,如何有效保证政府投资人的利益备受关注.针对该问题,基于委托-代理理论和优化理论,突破传统的单变量建模方法,将严格监管、有效激励与合谋防范纳入政府代建项目管理的框架,分别建立了以努力变量为多维变量的激励合同和监管模型,以及项目管理公司与承包商之间的合谋防范模型.最终建立了由政府投资人、项目管理公司及承包商等三大主体组成代建制的委托代理体系.
Asymmetrical information is common in the construction-agent system and it is very crucial to ensure government clients＇ benefits. Traditionally, only rigorous supervision was emphasized by government clients. However in modern principal-agent mode, above assumption is no longer valid. To solve this problem, a new management mode for government clients of the construction-agent system is presented based on principal-agent theory and optimization method. We analyze incentive contracts between government clients and contractors, and incentive contracts between government clients and professional managers respectively. Besides, the problem of collusion-proof between professional managers and contractors is profoundly discussed. Finally, novel study models are built respectively based on highly dimensional variables.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第1期40-45,共6页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家社会科学基金资助(05CJY020)
关键词
委托代理
激励合同
监管
合谋防范
principal-agent
incentive contract
monitoring
collusion-proof
