董事责任保险与公司治理

D&O insurance and coporate goverance

董事责任保险人可以担当公司治理水平的外部监督者,它能通过对公司治理风险进行精确定价,筛选合格的成员加入保险风险共同体的办法确保该共同体赢利。因此,在一个运行良好的保险市场上,董事责任保费的高低体现着保险人对一个公司治理水平的评估。简单的说,就是较高治理水平的公司的保险费相对较低,而治理水平较低的公司则需付出较高的保险费。这种简单的关系可以给投资者以及其他资本市场参与者提供重要的信息,但是这种信息目前并未被传递到资本市场中。公司缺乏主动披露自己购买的董事责任保险信息的动力,而证券监管机构也并未要求上市公司披露该信息。因此,证券监管机构应修改信息披露的规定,强制上市公司披露其持有的董事责任保险的详细内容.

D＆O insurers can act as gatekeepers of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, in a well-working insurance market, D＆O insurance premiums would convey the insurer＇s assessment of a firm＇s governance quality. Simply stated, firms with better corporate governance would pay relatively low D＆O premiums, while firms with worse corporate governance would pay more. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the signal is not being sent. Corporations lack the incentive to disclose this information on their own initiative, and securities regulators do not require listed corporations to do so. This Article, therefore, advocates a change to the regulation of information disclosure of listed corporations, making mandatory the disclosure of D＆O policy details - specifically, premiums, limits, and retentions under each type of coverage, as well as the identity of the insurer.