有效抑制道德风险的融资结构

Financing Structure with Effectively Restraining Effect on Moral Hazard

着重从道德风险有效抑制的角度探讨融资结构问题,得出两个主要观点:融资结构中若包括扮演积极监督者角色的大股东、债权人及持有一定数量公司股票的经管人员,将会有效地抑制由股权融资引起的企业经营管理者的道德风险行为;债权人可以通过与受信主体的长期合作,或加入到受信主体的董事会,来抑制由债权融资引起的股东及经营管理者的道德风险行为。基于观点,采用Jensen and Meckling分析所有权结构时的方法设计了一个最佳融资结构。

This paper probes into the frame of financing structure and mainly relates to its restraining effect on moral hazard. IF financing structure includes big shareholder as active supervisor, creditor and manager with shares of stock, it will effectively restrain moral hazard caused by stock financing. Moreover, creditor can effectively restrain moral hazard caused by liability financing. The measure can be cooperating with the loanee, and joining indebted enterprises＇ directorate to decrease the mutual asymmetric information. Based on aforementioned viewpoints, the paper designed a best financing structure.