纵向垄断市场下信息分享对定价决策权威的影响

The Effects of Information Sharing on the Pricing Power Based on the Vertical Monopolization

针对纵向垄断市场中由一个制造商和一个销售商组成的二级供应链,且销售商拥有市场需求的后验信息的情况,研究了销售商与制造商分享市场需求信息对双方中间产品定价决策权威的影响。证明了当销售商预测市场规模扩大时,信息分享后其定价决策权威增大,制造商利润减少;当销售商预测市场规模萎缩时,分享信息前后销售商的定价决策权威如何变化取决于其市场需求预测信息的相对精度。但不论需求如何变化销售商市场需求预测精度越高,销售商定价决策权威越大,其从分享信息策略中得到的受益越多。

Aiming at a two-echelon supply chain that consists of one manufacturer and one retailer based on the vertical monopolization, where the retailer owns posterior information of demand, the paper studies the effects of information shared with manufacturer by the retailer on both parties＇ pricing powers. We show that when the retailer forecasts the market scale may expand, information sharing increases her pricing power, but the profit of the manufacturer decreases; however, when the retailer forecasts the market scale may shrink, the change of the retailer＇s pricing power between ante and postinformation sharing depends on the relative precision of the forecast information. However, no matter how the demand changes, it is certain that the higher retailer＇s precision of forecasted information, the greater her pricing power and the more her benefit from the strategy of sharing information.