人口流动下跨区污染的两级政府政策分析

On two levels of government's policy for the transboundary pollution with population mobility

利用Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨在包含中央和地区两级政府的混合经济中,人口流动下跨区污染的政府政策选择.指出:当地区间的包含环境因素的生产技术存在差异时,为实现经济的最优状态必须进行地区间的收入转移;而在两级政府政策的博弈过程,无论是中央政府还是地区政府拥有最后选择权,只要中央政府制定适当的收入转移政策,经济均可达到社会性最优状态.分析了资源实现社会性最优配置的特征,导出了中央政府为实现社会性最优所应确立的收入转移原则.

In this paper, StackeUberg game models are employed to study the environmental policies of two levels of government for transboundary pollution with population mobility. The study shows that the interregional income transfer is necessary for the social optimum, if the regional production technologies are different. Moreover, in the policy game, whether the central government or the local governments are the Stackdberg leaders, the economy is able to achieve the social optimum by setting appropriate policy of income transfer, The character of the social optimum, and the central government＇ s optimal policy of income transfer are demonstrated.