零售商竞争环境下上游企业创新投入的供应链协调

Study on supply chain coordination of upstream innovation investment when retailers compete

建立了市场需求对价格敏感、存在两个相异的竞争的零售商情形下,上游制造商创新投入降低运作成本的供应链博弈模型.研究发现上游制造商创新投入具有外部(外溢)性,在制造商创新投入下,制造商和零售商的单位产品边际利润都得到了提高,并且零售商的竞争性越强,制造商的创新投入越大.证明了在分散决策情况下,制造商的创新投入无法达到供应链整体最优,提出了使供应链达到协调的基于数量折扣的混合契约,指出了该契约可以为各方接受的条件,最后利用具体算例分析验证了结论.

A supply chain game model about upstream innovation investment to decrease operating costs which consists of two competing heterogeneous retailers and demand sensitive to prices is constructed. The research illustrates that the innovation investment creates vertical externality within the channel. The manufacturer and the retailers all increase their marginal profits with the manufacturer＇s investment in innovation. It is also found that the more furious is the retailers＇ competition, the more the manufacturer will invest, and decentralized decision cannot coordinate the supply chain innovation investment. A compound contract of supply chain coordination based on quantity-discount schedule is proposed and the conditions which are feasible to all supply chain members are pointed out. In the end, a numerical example is provided to verify the conclusion.