基于入门费的腐败与金融制度研究被引量：5

Corruption Based on Entry Fees and Financial Institution

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摘要从世界范围内看,高腐败发生率是不争的事实。究竟是什么原因使得腐败长期存在而不消亡?将政治经济腐败问题延伸到官僚体制的各层次之间,提出下级官员为获得有利可图的职位而需向上级官员付出入门费。通过对入门费的不同筹集模式的比较分析,研究金融制度与腐败收益率及其在不同相关利益群体之间的利益分割,来探讨金融制度和腐败发生率之间的关系,论证功能良好的金融制度的存在以及审查监督的有效性改变了公共部门的租金分配,可以降低腐败水平。 Around the world, especially in transitional and developing countries, what cause the high corruption levels, and what make political economy corruption long- standing？. Investigating how corruption spreads through the different levels of the bureaucracy helps to explain its persistence. The article advances that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to their superiors. Through the mode of financing the entry fee, the article studies on the relation between financial institution and corruption levels, on the functioning financial market and its valid screening change the rents distribution in public section. Well - functioning financial institutions can decrease the political economy corruption.

作者南旭光孟卫东

机构地区重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出处《中国软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第1期56-61,共6页 China Soft Science

关键词腐败入门费金融制度经济体系 corruption entry fees financial institution economic system

分类号 F830.1 [经济管理—金融学]

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