基于委托代理的供应链质量管理激励策略

Incentive Strategy of Quality Control in Supply Chain Based on Principal-agent Theory

利用委托代理模型建立了供应链质量管理的激励模型,从购买商对供应商质量管理监管的角度出发,探讨了不同风险态度下最优激励合约的设计问题,求出了模型的最优解并进一步讨论其影响因素。最后,拓展分析了声誉激励的效果,为寻求有效的供应链质量管理提供理论依据。

This paper uses the theory of principal-agency to construct incentive models of quality control in supply chain. On the basis of different risk attitude, discusses how to set up optimum contract from the perspective of the supervision between supplier and buyer, and analyzes the factors which affect the optimum result. At last, reputation incentive coefficient is induced to original models： The study provides the theoretical basis for effective quality control in supply chain.