非对称生产规模供应商的两阶段投标策略

Two Stage Procurement Auction with Bidders of Asymmetric Capacity

在小型供应商只能参加第二阶段竞标条件下,研究了非对称生产规模供应商的两阶段第二价格封闭式投标.通过建立博弈论模型,得出了大型和小型供应商的最优投标策略.研究发现:引进小型供应商参加竞标,可以降低平均期望采购成本,但是大型供应商在第一阶段会抬高自己的报价;而随着小型供应商数量的增加,采购方可能支付的额外采购成本也在增加.

Under the condition that small capacity suppliers only can attend the second stage bidding, this paper consider inviting suppliers with different capacities to a procurement auction, which adopt sequential second price sealed mechanism. By formulating game theoretic models, the optimal strategies of both suppliers are generated. The results show that although the expected procurement cost is reduced, the large size suppliers will enlarge uheir bidding price at the first stage. The additional procurement cost will be increasing with more small size suppliers＇ involvement.