摘要
为解决共有流动性集群资源的过度利用问题,渔业管理部门往往采用捕捞许可证制度、禁渔制度、渔船回购制度或其它一些"命令与控制"式的行政调控措施。理论预期和实证研究均表明,此类制度或措施难以对捕捞能力形成有效的约束,因为诱发过度投资进而导致捕捞能力过度膨胀的激励始终存在。对渔船征收年度一次性资本税是一种可行的替代方案,因为这是一种"釜底抽薪"的治本之举,能够根除捕捞能力恶性膨胀的诱导因素。
Fishing licence, time and area closures, vessel buyback scheme and administrative regulations in "command and control" schemes on the fishing capacity are often used to reduce the problem of overcapacity in common pool fisheries. However, theory anticipation and demonstration research indicate that these means are seldom very effective as to limit the overcapacity in the longer term, the reason being that the regulations do not impact the basic incentives in the creation of overcapacity. A way to reduce the tendency for overcapacity in common pool fishery is to use lump sum taxation of the capital per year. Collecting lump sum taxation yearly on fishing boats is a feasible scheme, because this method is a radical action of "taking a drastic measure to deal with a situation", and it can deracinate the factors of inducing fishing capacity to expand malignantly.
出处
《中国渔业经济》
2007年第5期21-24,共4页
Chinese Fisheries Economics
关键词
共有渔业资源管理
捕捞能力调控
渔船回购制度
资本税
management of common fisheries resources
regulations Of fishing capacity
vessels buyback scheme
capital tax