研究开发支出与经理人员选择

研究开发是技术创新的源泉，是企业获得核心竞争力和实现持续发展的原动力。但是研究开发由于成本高、风险大、回收期长以及研发支出一次性费用化的特点，使得其对企业短期业绩不利。经济人假设下的经理人在面临研究开发支出选择时，会从自身利益的角度出发，甚至不惜牺牲所有者的利益。本文通过对我国薪酬制度和经理人选拔机制现状的分析，推出经理人在这些机制的影响下，在研究开发支出决策过程中可能产生的行为选择。

R＆D is the source of technology innovation and the motivity for an enterprise to achieve core competition advantages. However, it has adverse effect on short term performance due to its characteristic of high input, high risk, and one-off expensing accounting treatment on R＆D expenses etc. Under the economic man hypothesis, when make a decision on R＆D, managers will consider basing on their own benefits, and may even harm the benefits of owners. This dissertation, by analyzing the compensation system and the selecting and promoting mechanism of managers in China, deduces that under such mechanism, managers may take what kind of potential actions in the decision-making process of R＆D expenditures.