摘要
根据1956年至1976年的美国国家情报评估,美国情报部门基本勾勒了中国导弹计划的发展脉络,但在细节方面,其误判堪称俯拾皆是。这既有主观原因,又有客观因素。不过这些评估报告是决策者判断中国军事力量最重要的依据,也是美国对华政策的主要参考。
According to the national intelligence estimate for the years from 1956-1976, the U. S intelligence community drew a roughly correct outline of China ' s missile program, but with respect to details there were full of mistakes in their estimates due to subject and objective factors. However, these intelligence reports served as the most important grounds for the American decision makers to judge the Chinese military strength and the main reference materials for them to formulate their China policy.
出处
《中共党史研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第1期66-74,共9页
CPC History Studies
基金
2007年国家社科基金(07CSS007)
上海市哲学社会科学规划重大课题(2007DTQ001)的前期成果