隐蔽信息条件下两级供应链系统1∶n协调激励模型

Principal-Agent Motivational Model under the Hidden Information Condition

主要研究供应商在不能确定零售商类型的条件下,如何对零售商进行有效的协调激励,以实现供应商最大化利益。首先从特殊的情况出发,即假设存在两种类型零售商、三种类型零售商,分别建立协调激励模型,在此基础上,提出供应商面对n种类型零售商时,供应商最优协调激励模型。

This paper primarily studies the principal how to motivate agents to maximize its interests under the condition that the principal is unsure of the type of agents he faces. The paper first gives the motivational model and the optimum scheme under two types of agents and three types of agents, and then gives the motivational model and the optimum scheme under many types of agents.