信息不对称、信号传递方式与供应商甄选博弈

Asymmetric Information,Signaling Manner and Vendor Selection Game

论文从供应商传递信息方式的角度来研究信息不对称情形下供应商的甄选问题。研究首先将对称信息与非对称信息情况下供应商甄选结果及供需双方的收益进行比较,得出信息不对称导致供应链上供应商的逆向选择问题。然后运用信号传递成本无差异与信号传递成本有差异这两种类型信号博弈模型来解决不对称信息下的供应商选择问题,并得出结论只有信号传递成本在不同类型的供应商之间存在差异,信号才能起到类型显示的作用,从而解决信息不对称情形下供应商的甄选问题。

This paper discusses the vendor selection under asymmetric information from the aspect of signaling manner. It compares the selection outcome and benefits between symmetric information and asymmetric information, and concludes that asymmetric information leads to adverse selection in the vendor selection in the supply chain. This paper also utilizes the equal cost signaling game model and unequal cost signaling game model to investigate the vendor selection under asymmetric information, and concludes that only unequal cost signaling manner reveals the real type of the supplier and solves the adverse selection in the vendor selection in the supply chain.