行政垄断规制失灵的博弈分析

On The Failure of Gambling in Administrative Monotony Regulation

文章运用博弈论的基本原理,通过中央政府、行政垄断规制机构与行政垄断企业的重复博弈分析,得出了行政垄断规制失灵的基本结论。行政垄断规制失灵取决于各方博弈中利益集团所承担的成本和被查处的概率;规制目的的实现取决于博弈双方的策略选择;规制机构中的政府官员作为各种政策的制定者和强制执行者,决定着行政垄断行为的方向和政策的实施。这些结论是对政府规制失灵博弈的一般分析,它同样适合于对我国行政规制失灵的分析。

The author adopted the fundamental laws of game theory, firstly studied the repeated gambling among the central government, administrative regulative institutes and administrative monopoly enterprises, then came to the conclusion that the administrative regulative system has not succeeded. The failure in administrative monopoly regulation relies on the costs that the participants undertook and the rates of being investigated. The realization of the purpose of regulation depends on the strategic choices between the two gambling parties. The government officials, being the makers and executors of diverse policies, decide on the implementing of policies and the direction of administrative monopoly behavior. All of the conclusions are not only based on the general analysis on the failure in governmental regulative gambling, but also suited to the analysis on the failure in China＇ s administrative regulation.