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产权的社会建构逻辑--从博弈论的观点评中国社会学家的产权研究 被引量:88

The Social Construction Logic of Property Rights:A review on the property rights studies of Chinese sociologists from the perspective of game theory
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摘要 Chinese sociologists have made two contributions to the property rights studies of contemporary Chinese society. One contribution is that they have revealed that the property rights contracts of rural collective assets are based on principles of fairness—the principle of survival,the principle of equality to community members, the principle of taking land’s boundary as delimitation, and the principle that benefits belongs to investors. The other contribution is that they have discovered that the rules of property rights delimitation are diverse and uncertain in China, and the clients often rely on their own might to choose rules and to advocate their rights. The first contribution can help us understand the logic of social construction of "collective ownership", but lacks logical inference in the end. The other contribution is a challenge to a conclusion of the game theory of evolution—the local confirmity affect of institutional evolution, however, the challenge needs more empirical evidence to be rigorous. Chinese sociologists have made two contributions to the property rights studies of contemporary Chinese society. One contribution is that they have revealed that the property rights contracts of rural collective assets are based on principles of fairness—the principle of survival,the principle of equality to community members, the principle of taking land's boundary as delimitation, and the principle that benefits belongs to investors. The other contribution is that they have discovered that the rules of property rights delimitation are diverse and uncertain in China, and the clients often rely on their own might to choose rules and to advocate their rights. The first contribution can help us understand the logic of social construction of 'collective ownership', but lacks logical inference in the end. The other contribution is a challenge to a conclusion of the game theory of evolution—the local confirmity affect of institutional evolution, however, the challenge needs more empirical evidence to be rigorous.
作者 曹正汉
出处 《社会学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第1期200-216,共17页 Sociological Studies
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