含服务水平约束的可控提前期供应链Stackelberg模型与协调机制研究

Stackelberg Model for Controllable Lead Time Supply Chain with Service Level Constrains and Its Coordination Mechanism

为了有效地缩短订货提前期与降低库存成本,首先从Stackelberg主从对策角度建立了含服务水平约束的可控提前期供应链库存优化模型,提出了该模型的求解算法;然后从集中决策角度建立了另一类含服务水平约束的可控提前期供应链库存优化模型,并提出该模型的求解算法。利用数值分析对两类模型的优化效果进行比较,结果表明:集中决策模式下的优化效果明显优于Stackelberg主从对策模式下的优化效果,但在缺乏合理的激励机制情形下,供应链各参与方未必有足够积极性接受集中决策模式。为此,提出一种库存费用分担机制来激励供应链各参与方接受集中决策模式。

From stackelberg leader-follower game, a controllable lead time supply chain inventory optimization model with service level constrains and its algorithm are proposed based on centralized decison making mode to shorten the lead time of order goods and reduce the inventory cost effectively. The optimization effects of the two models were compared by numerical analysis. The result shows that the optimization effect of the model based on centralized decision making mode is better than that of stackelberg leader-follower game. The parties of supply chain may not have enough enthusiasm to accept centralized decision making mode, without reasonable incentive mechniss. A kind of inventory cost sharing mechanism is also proposed to stimulate the each party of supply chain to accept centralized decision making mode.