竞争还是产权--对国有企业激励机制的经验考察

Competition or Ownership——An empirical investigation to the mechanism of SOEs

我们利用2001—2003年全国规模以上工业企业的平衡面板数据,检验了关于国有企业改革的两种假说:产权论和市场论。产权论认为国有企业改革的关键是产权改革,而市场论认为关键是为国有企业创造一个竞争性的市场环境。结果表明,以企业的主营业务销售利润率为因变量,给定市场竞争程度,国有产权明显比其他所有制带来更低的经营绩效,而且在各种竞争程度的市场环境下国有产权的劣势都很明显;在考虑了市场竞争对产权的影响后,国有资本对企业绩效的影响是显著负的,而私营资本对企业绩效的影响是显著正的。这表明,当前国有企业改革的重点应该是产权改革,是继续改善国有企业内部治理结构。

Using 2001-2003 firm-level panel data of manufacturing firms above scale in China, the paper tests two hypotheses, the ownership argument and the market argument. The ownership argument states that the key of state-owned enterprises（SOEs）reform is to change ownership, however the market argument considers that creating a competitive market is the most important. This paper shows that comparing to other ownerships, SOEs strongly lead to worse business performance represented by business profit rate viven the degree of market competition, and the outcome holds in all degrees of market competition. Controlling the effect of market competition on ownership, state-owned capital still has strong negative effect on business performance, but private capital has strong positive effect. This paper indicates that the key of SOEs reform is the ownership and the internal governance of SOEs.