逆向物流系统激励机制优化研究

A Study of Optimizing Incentive Mechanism of Reverse Logistics System

随着环境立法日益严格以及市场竞争的加剧,逆向物流日益引起国内外企业管理者和学者的重视。以委托—代理理论为理论基础,通过引入辅助观测变量——制造商对其他零售商回收的废旧产品再处理所得的收益——建立优化模型,可用以分析辅助观测变量和其他因素对激励强度系数和代理成本的影响。分析结果表明:适当引入辅助观测变量能有效降低代理成本,提高激励强度。

Due to the more strict legislation on environment protection and an increasing market competition, reverse logistics has gradually attracted the attention of enterprise management personnel and researchers. The paper, based on the principal-agent theory and introducing an auxiliary observing variable, i.e. the profits gained by producer from recycling used products that are recovered by retailers, sets up an optimal model of analyzing the influence of auxiliary observing variable and other factors upon the incentive intensity and agency costs. The results of analysis indicate that proper introduction of auxiliary observing variable can reduce the agency costs and increase incentive intensity.