资本结构与代理成本——来自中国国有控股上市公司和民营上市公司的经验证据

Capital Structure and Agency Costs: The Empirical Evidence from State-controlling Listed Companies and Private Listed Companies in China

资本结构如何影响代理成本是资本结构研究的一个重要领域。本文以2000-2005年国有控股上市公司和民营上市公司为研究对象,通过对这一问题的实证分析发现,控股股东持股比例与民营上市公司代理成本负相关,而与国有控股上市公司代理成本正相关;第二至十大股东持股比例与代理成本呈负相关,对民营上市公司代理成本的影响效果要好于国有控股上市公司;管理者持股比例与代理成本正相关;社会公众股比例与上市公司代理成本不存在相关性;债务总体水平与代理成本正相关,但在国有控股上市公司中的程度要大于民营上市公司;银行借款比例对代理成本的影响要好于商业信用比例,这两种债务比例对民营上市公司代理成本的效果影响要好于国有控股上市公司;流动负债比例和长期借款比例与上市公司的代理成本正相关。总之,民营上市公司的代理成本要低于国有控股上市公司,资本结构是造成这种差异的重要因素。这一结论的政策意义在于:完善资本结构有助于我国上市公司改善治理结构、降低代理成本;我国政府要进一步推进民营化改革,以不断提高我国上市公司质量。

How capital structure influence corporate agency costs is an important area in the research on capital structure. This paper takes the state-controlling listed companies and private listed companies over the time framework between 2000 and 2005 as research objects and make analysis on this question. Through empirical research, we find that the proportion of stocks held by controlling shareholder is negatively correlated with agency costs in private listed companies, and positively correlated with agency costs in state-controlling listed companies; the proportions of stocks held by the second to the tenth largest shareholders are negatively correlated with agency costs, and their influences on agency costs in statecontrolling listed companies are better than that in private listed companies; the executive stock proportion is negatively correlated with agency costs; there is no correlation between of proportion of public held stocks and agency costs; the overall debt level is positively correlated with agency costs, but in state-controlling listed companies the extents are greater than in private listed companies; the influence of bank loans on agency costs is better than that of commercial credits, both of which in private listed companies are better than those in state-controlling listed companies; term of debt is positively correlated with agency costs. All in all, the agency costs is lower in private listed companies than in state-controlling listed companies, capital structure is also one of the most important factors that causes the difference in agency costs between private listed companies and state-controlling listed companies. The significance in policy of this conclusion lies in that perfect capital structure is conducive to improve the governance structure of our listed companies and decrease agency costs, and that our government should further promote the reform for privatization so as to improve the quality of listed companies in our country.