摘要
后MBO上市公司的股利分配现象是公司股利政策和MBO研究的一个交叉点。本文的实证分析发现,后MBO上市公司偏好现金股利,支付现金股利的公司家数占比、现金股利支付水平都高于上市公司总体,股票股利支付水平平均也高于总体。后MBO公司现金股利支付率与公司现金流量、资本公积金累积、资产规模等正相关,与资产负债率负相关。而第一大股东持股比例并未显著影响公司的股利发放。本文的主要贡献在于否定了MBO会导致公司高现金分红或称"恶性分红"的命题,认为MBO公司一直实行高于市场平均水平的股息分配,并未因股权变更而改变股利政策,这对进一步研究该类公司的治理问题具有重要意义。
The paper studies the dividend policy of post-MBO companies by statistics description and multiple regression model. The result shows that the post-MBO companies are inclined to paying high cash dividends. Firstly, the paper defines the Chinese management buy-out and limits the MBO samples to 20 listed companies strictly, Most of the MBO companies' ownership transform happened in 2001 -2003. Then the paper finds that both the number and the cash dividend payout ratios of the MBO samples are higher than that of the collectivity before MBO and after MBO. During 1998- 2006 the mean cash dividend per share of the MBO companies is 0.107 Yuan and the cash dividend payout ratio is 34%. Meanwhile the mean cash dividend per share of the whole listed companies is 0.072 Yuan and the cash dividend payout ratio is 28%, The T-test proves that the difference of the cash dividend between the MBO samples and the collectivity is distinct in 2000, 2001 and 2005. But the difference is indistinct in other years, Then the Wilcoxon-test checks the difference of the cash dividend and the stock dividend of the MBO companies three years before MBO and that three years after MBO, It results that there are no distinctive difference between the two groups' figures. So we can deduce that the dividend policy of the MBO companies doesn't change after MBO. Then the authors go on to find the factors which affect the dividend policy using the multiple regression model. The cash dividend payout ratio of post-MBO companies is positively correlated to the cash flow, the capital surplus, the asset of the companies, And it is negatively correlated to the debt-asset ratio. The most important finding is that the share proportion of the largest shareholder doesn't affect the dividend payout (both of cash dividend and stock dividend). In conclusion the main contribution of the paper is that it clarifies that the companies don't change their dividend policy after MBO, The paper denies the hypothesis of high cash dividend policy's transition of post-MBO companies. So how do the companies pay their high buyout debt? Will the management of MBO companies tunnel the benefits of the companies to themselves to pay their debt? The paper put forward these questions and it is instructive for further study on corporate governance of post-MBO companies.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
2008年第1期58-65,77,共9页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目(05CJL011)
上海财经大学211三期项目的资助