实验市场中的股权结构、信息与控制权收益

Ownership Structure, Information and Benefits of Control in the Experimental Market

实验室环境下的决策过程研究可以较好地考察决策变量的行为基础和动态临界值,本文以中国股市中的股权结构为背景,在实验框架下考察了股权结构、信息披露和控制权收益的关系。文章先从理论上计算股东的夏普利值并以此代表股东控制权,再分不同设置变量来实验地考察控制权收益。结果表明:(1)股东控制权越平均,控制权收益越少;大股东与小股东形成"核"联盟的机会越多,其取得控制权的机会越少。(2)信息对控制权收益的影响主要体现在信息在联盟的形成和维持中的作用。(3)大股东夏普利值的高低和信息情况决定了联盟的方式。(4)控制权溢价并不一定就是控制权收益,也许只是大股东为防止自身利益被侵害而支付的成本。(5)信息不完全不一定是坏事,部分信息的隐含更能增加公司的分配效率。

With the rapid development of laboratory experimentation in economics and management, as well as their neighbor disciplines, behavioral approach has become as important as normative and positive approach. The behavioral foundations and dynamic thresholds of people＇s decision variables can only be better studied by investigating the process of subjects＇ decision making in the laboratory experimental context, in which we can control all the irrelevant variables as possible as we could. In accordance with the ownership structure pattern of China listed companies, this paper focuses on the relationship among ownership structure, information disclosure and benefits of control under laboratory experimentation approach. Firstly, we figure out the theoretical Shapley Value of different shareholders as the agency variable of their control right, then we study the benefits of control in various experimental treatments. Our experimental results show that： （1） The more counterbalance of the shareholder＇s control right, the less benefits of their control right. Accordingly, the more chance to form core alliance for the large stockholder, the less chance for them to get control rights; （2） The effect of information on benefits of control are mainly responsible for forming and maintaining the alliances; （3） The Shapley value and information condition of large stockholder determine the mode of alliances; （4） The premiums of control right may be the cost paid by large stockholder to keep their controlling position clear from other stockholders＇ interference than just the controlling benefits; （5） Information imperfection is not always bad, sometimes properly-designed incomplete information conditions can improve the distribution efficiency of corporations substantially. It is maybe the first experimental research in our country, which addresses the issue on the ownership structure of public corporation, so the resuits above are very constructive for us to understanding the game between various stockholders, especially the stockholders of china listed companies.