房地产宏观调控中的三方动态博弈问题

Three-side Dynamic Game Analysis on Macro-Controlling in the Domain of Real Estate

城市房价飞涨正在演变成一个严重的社会经济问题,中央政府有必要对此实施严厉的宏观调控政策。本文从博弈论和制度经济学角度,探讨了中央政府、地方政府与房地产开发企业之间委托-代理、管制-被管制的博弈关系,重点分析了中央政府监督成本、地方政府设租概率和房地产企业价格合谋概率这三者相互作用的机理。指出房地产企业价格合谋和地方政府设租的现象会在相当大的范围内长期存在,但这两者对于中央政府都是可控的。建议中央政府在设计房地产宏观调控机制时,应着重降低对地方政府设租行为的监督成本。

In the domain of real estate, there is a serious social and economical problem that house prices are skyrocketing in major cities. Therefore rigorous macro-controls of central government become a necessity. Based on game theory and institutional economics, the relationship of principal-agent between central and local governments and of controlling-controlled between local government and price-collusive real estate enterprises in the game are discussed in the paper respectively. As an emphasis, the structure and mutual effect of the three sides, such as supervising cost of central government, rent-seeking probability of local government and probability of price-collusion are analyzed by game equilibrium solutions. Then it is pointed out that the phenomenon of price-collusion and rent-seeking in real estate market will exist longer in a sizeable area, but for central government, the two is controllable and it is most important to decrease the supervising cost when building the function mechanism.