不确定性与监督成本对经理人激励制度的影响

A Research on the Effect of Uncertainty and Monitoring Cost on Manager′s Motivation Institution

分成制是最为常见的经理人激励制度,通过构建经理人效用函数模型,论证了不确定性和监督成本的增加将会降低分成制对经理人的激励作用。随着外部环境不确定性加大,专业化分工和资本市场的发展导致监督成本的提高,分成制对经理人激励的局限性也愈加明显。而基于最终剩余索取权的报酬制度通过先支付股东满意收益后的超额利润对经理人进行激励,改变了剩余索取权的分配序列,将能够使风险与收益相统一,对经理人实施有效激励。

Profit-sharing is the commonest manager＇s motivation institution. By constructing the manager＇s utility function model, it is proved in this paper that along with the increase in the uncertainty and monitoring cost, the incentive effect of profit-sharing on managers will decrease. With the enlargement of the environmental uncertainty and the rise of monitoring cost caused by the development of specialization and capital market, the weakness of profit-sharing is getting obvious. The payment system based on the ultimate residual-claim changes the order of profit allocation, and through this system the stock-holders get their satisfied profit before the managers take the excess profit as incentive reward. Also this payment system will result in a consistency of risk and profit, and thus effectively motivate managers.