摘要
在考虑企业声誉激励的前提下.运用间接演化方法,提出了供应链合作伙伴(Supply Chain Partnerships,SCP)系统中企业合作偏好度的演化博弈(Evolutionary Game)模型,分析了SCP系统的内在演化机制,研究了仅与产量相关以及与产量和企业合作偏好度都相关的企业声誉激励机制对SCP系统企业合作偏好度演化稳定的影响,得到了相关的结论.
The process to form SCP system is an evolutionary game among the enterprise-agents. And it is dynamic process of enterprise-agents strategy behavior. Therefore, based reputation incentive, it brings forward the indirect evolution model of cooperation inclination degree among the enterprise-agents of SCP system. And it presents series of conclusion about SCP system cooperation inclination degree evolutionary stable. It will have important practice value to improve decision-making dynamic adapt ability of SCP system and implement efficiency control policy.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第4期58-63,共6页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
关键词
供应链合作伙伴
演化博弈
演化稳定策略
间接演化
声誉
supply chain partnerships
evolutionary game
evolutionary stable strategy
indirect evolution
reputation
