产权视角下的国有企业审计寻租问题分析

Analysis on Rent-Seeking Problems on State-owned Enterprises——From the Viewpoint of Property Rights

在国有企业改制过程中,独立审计并未很好地发挥其应有的界定和保护产权的功能,审计寻租活动大量出现。它为审计寻租者"生产"出超额利润——租金,但从社会的角度来看,这部分非生产性的支出,是引起经济资源配置无效率的重要原因之一。本文以寻租理论和产权理论为切入点,分析了国有企业审计寻租问题的产权机理,并提出了解决审计寻租问题的对策。

In the restructuring process of state-owned enterprises, independent audit didn＇t play a good role in defining and protecting property rights, and the rent-seeking activities appeared in large scale. A lot of rents emerge in the independent audit market,but from the social point of view, this non-productive expenditure leads to inefficient allocation of economic resources dramatically. Based on rent-seeking theory and property rights theory, this article analyzes property mechanism in the state-owned enterprises, and provides some suggestions to deal with the problem of rent-seeking in independent audit issues.