中国企业经理人是自利和理性的吗?——一个实验经济学研究

Are Chineses Managers Self-Benefit and Reasonable?

"经济人自利和理性"假设是经济学的最核心假设。西方实验经济学家通过一系列博弈试验,证实了人们完全"自利"、"理性"的假设并不成立。但实验参与人群及其文化历史背景的变化对实验结果的影响一直是人们关注的焦点。因此,本文利用精心设计的"信任博弈"实验,对中国的企业经理人的"自利"、"理性"假设进行了实验研究,并且将企业经理人的实验结果与学生身份的实验参与者的实验结果做了对比研究。实验结果证实了西方实验经济学家的结论,发现中国的企业经理人并不是完全"自利"、"理性"的机会主义者,同时,本实验还揭示了被标准的委托代理理论忽视了的激励手段所带来的隐含成本和隐含收益。在此基础上,本文提出了企业经理人激励约束的政策建议。

Economic man hypothesis including selfishness and rationality is a basic hypothesis of economics. To prove this hypothesis, western experiment economists applied a series of experiments with it, and found it does not comply with human behaviors. But people are concerned with the impacts of changes of experiment subjects and their cultural and historical backgrounds on the experiment results. So this paper conducts an ＂trust game＂experiment on the selfishness and rationality of Chinese managers and college students, which confirms the results of above experiments in that those managers are not pure selfish and rational. Then contrast research is conducted between managers and students. At the same time, this experiment discovers the implicit cost and income of incentives, which is neglected by the agent theory. Finally, some suggestions about managers incentives and constraints are put forward.