摘要
通过对行为决策理论的腐败选择行为模型的分析和研究,我们发现,对于面对损失具有风险偏好倾向的腐败者,虽然位卑权小时廉洁守法,升职后却可能走向腐败。而且,一个弹性的惩罚制度环境会增加行为人的违规价值预期,强化行为人逃避严惩的侥幸心理,加剧腐败行为蔓延。所以,建立科学合理的用人机制,优化监督环境,提高惩罚制度的执行力,是遏制腐败蔓延的有效手段。
The article looks at the corruption preference behavior based on the model of Behavioral Decision Theory. It is found that the lower raking government officials, honest and law-abiding as they may be, are inclined to corrupt after promotion. It is also found that flexible and lenient penalty can result in the anticipation of high benefit and low risk of corruption, thus encouraging the fluke mindedness and giving rise to rampant corruption. It follows then that an effective mechanism to contain corruption should includeestablishing a scientific system of personnel, optimizing the regulatory function and enhancing the enforcement of penalty.
出处
《当代财经》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第2期7-12,共6页
Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“和谐社会构建中地方政府政策执行力研究”(07BZZ018)
