摘要
竞价机制的设计一直是电力市场设计的难点。采用Swarm仿真的研究方法对两种竞价机制的均衡过程进行了比较分析。仿真发现,在市场出清价MCP(Market clearing price)和按报价支付PAB(Pay-as-Bid)机制下,在发电商博弈过程中,PAB机制中出清电价低于MCP机制;在发电商博弈达到市场均衡后,MAC机制中出清电价低于PAB机制;在PAB机制中,每个发电商成交电量和成交价格的波动幅度要小于MCP机制。在竞争博弈过程中发电商的无意识共谋行为也是两种竞价机制中存在市场力的原因之一。
The research of compete price mechanism always is the difficulty to design power market. This paper uses the Swarm simulation as a research technique, to carry on the comparative analysis in two kinds of compete price mechanism. Through the simulation, it discovers some phenomena in MCP （Market clearing price） and PAB （Pay-as-Bid） under the mechanism. In the electricity generation business and gaming process, the price in PAB mechanism is lower than it in MCP mechanism. After electricity generation business gambling achieved market equilibrium, the price under the MAC mechanism is lower than it in PAB mechanism. After the PAB mechanism achieved market equilibrium, the electric quantity and the deal price volatility margin is smaller than the MCP mechanism. Unconscious collusion in competition gambling process also is one of cause which generator implement cause market power in PAB and MCP mechanism.
出处
《继电器》
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第1期37-42,共6页
Relay
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(90510016)~~
