投资者保护、代理成本与公司绩效

Investor Protection,Agency Cost and Corporate Performance

本文基于一个构造的各地区2001—2004年的投资者保护指标,研究了该指标与公司绩效的关系。我们的研究发现:投资者保护水平与公司绩效正相关;国有控股上市公司的投资者保护水平与公司绩效的关系更显著。我们还发现,投资者保护水平能减弱控股股东的控制权和公司绩效的关系,降低控股股东对上市公司的资金占用,并减少上市公司对外部审计的需求。

Based on a constructed index for investor＇s protection in 2000-2004, this paper examines the effeet of investor＇s protection on corporate performance. We find that corporate performance is positively associated with the degree of investor＇ s protection, and this association becomes strengthened for state-controlling listed companies. We also find that a higher degree of investor＇ s protection tends to reduce the negative effect of controlling shareholding on corporate performance, limit the funds appropriation by controlling shareholders, and lower the demand for outside auditing.