第三方物流道德风险监督机制的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Monitoring Mechanism on Moral Hazard of the Third Party Logistics

以货主企业与第三方物流企业合作中存在的道德风险为出发点,构建了双方共同承担监督成本的监督机制模型,通过博弈分析得出:货主企业应将惩罚金和监督成本控制在一定范围内,同时应适当逐步加大固定监督成本的投入。

Based on the moral hazard which exits in cooperation between the consignor enterprise and the third party logistics, this article construCts the supervisory mechanisms model which cost of supervision is shared by both sides. Through Game analysis we can conclude. The consignor controls the fine and the cost of supervision in a certain range, while gradually increasing inputs of fixed costs of supervision.