控股股东所有权、双向资金占用与盈余质量

Ownership of Controlling Shareholders,Bidirectional Embezzlement of Funds and Earnings Quality

文章以我国上市公司2003-2005年的数据为样本,检验了控股股东所有权、双向资金占用和盈余质量之间的关系。研究发现,控股股东所有权与应计项目之间存在倒"N"型曲线关系;在控股股东持股较少时,控股股东通过占用上市公司资金降低了盈余质量,与所有权防御效应一致;当控股股东持股较多时,控股股东所有权与盈余质量之间呈现不显著的正相关。文章认为,如果控股股东通过双向资金占用影响盈余质量,那么盈余质量是低的;如果控股股东没有通过双向资金占用影响盈余质量,双向资金占用行为本身也会降低盈余质量。文章最后提出政策建议。

With the data during 2003-2005 of China＇ s listed companies, this study examines the relations among controlling shareholders, bidirectional embezzlement of funds and earnings quality. We find that the relations between controlling shareholders＇ ownership and total accruals are inversed ＂N＂ curve. When controlling shareholders＇ ownership is low, controlling shareholders make use of embezzlement of listed company＇s funds to lower earnings quality, consistent with entrenchment effect. When controlling shareholders＇ ownership is high, the relations between controlling shareholders＇ ownership and earnings quality are not positive significantly. If controlling shareholders make use of embezzlement of listed company＇s funds to affect earnings quality, earnings quality is low; if controlling shareholders don＇t make use of embezzlement of listed company＇s funds to affect earnings quality, embezzlement of listed company＇s funds also lower earn- ings quality.