摘要
当前规制者面临电力传输企业可能通过降低服务质量而不是通过追求真正的效率改善来降低成本的问题。文章首先重申了现有单纯以成本降低为激励的激励性价格规制(价格上限)可能导致投资的扭曲,从而导致电力传输企业服务质量下降这一命题;然后对电力传输企业服务质量激励性规制模型的重要组成部分——规制指标进行了探讨;通过Malmquist生产率指数将电力传输企业价格规制和传输服务质量激励有效结合,达到成本节约和服务质量之间的均衡,对价格上限激励规制模型进行修正,构建了综合考虑价格规制和服务质量激励的服务质量激励规制模型。
The current regulatory system is facing with the problem that the cost cutting of power transmission enterprise is realized by deteriorating the service quality while not by straining after true improvement of efficiency. The authors firstly reiterate the thesis that the existing price regulation incentive system （price caps） which simply takes the cost cutting as the motivation may lead to investment distortion; then the important component of incentive regulation model for service quality of power transmission enterprise, namely the regulation indicators, is researched. By means of Malmquist productivity index the price regulation of power transmission enterprise is effectively combined with transmission service quality incentive to attain a link to balance the cost saving and service quality, and then the incentive regulation model of price caps is modified to construct an incentive regulation model which comprehensively considers the price regulation and service quality incentive.
出处
《电网技术》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第5期75-81,共7页
Power System Technology
基金
国家哲学社会科学基金资助项目(06BJY008)
关键词
激励性规制
价格上限
服务质量
数据包络分析
incentive regulation
price caps
quality of service
data envelopment analysis （DEA）
