期刊文献+

同质性组合激励机制的研究 被引量:3

To Study on the Mechanism of Homogeneous Combination Incentive
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摘要 基于激励源的多维性和层次性特征,研究委托-代理关系中的组合激励问题,给出同质性和异质性组合激励机制的一般模型。重点讨论同质性组合激励机制,以经营者的长期和短期报酬组合为例,获得同质性组合激励模型的最优解;使得经营者和所有者的期望效用最大化,并分析模型中的相关参数对组合激励绩效的影响,指出其实际应用价值。 Based on the characteristic of multi-dimension and multi-arrangement about incentive resource, this paper studies the problem of combination incentive among the principal-agent relationship, gives the general models of homogeneous and heterogeneous combination incentive, mainly discusses the mechanism of homogeneous combination incentive. Using the combination incentive of operator's long-term and short-term reward as a sample,it obtains the optimal solution of homogeneous combination incentive, which maximizes the utility of operator and possessor,analyzes the effects of parameters in the model on the performance of combination incentive, and points out its practical value.
作者 俞云
出处 《价值工程》 2008年第3期119-121,共3页 Value Engineering
关键词 效用最大化 激励源 同质性组合激励 博弈均衡 utility maximization incentive resource homogeneous combination incentive game equilibrium
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参考文献6

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