品牌专营下供应链价格和批量联合最优决策

The Optimum Decisions on Combined Pricing and Inventory of Supply Chain under Brand Specialization

假定需求是价格的函数,首先研究了非品牌专营下供应链的最优价格决策和最优批量决策,然后研究了品牌专营下供应商、零售商价格和批量的最优决策。建立了供应商优先决策的Stackelberg博弈模型,通过求解得到了该博弈问题均衡解,即得到了供应商控制的品牌产品最优零售价格和零售商控制的最优订货批量。最后将该模型应用于一个实例中,比较了非品牌专营下和品牌专营下最优决策的不同和供应链利润的不同,品牌专营提高了供应链整体的利润以及供应商自身利润占整个供应链利润的比例。

The problem of optimum price and order quantity in supply chain are modeled for normal goods whose demand depends on price. Then, in the condition of brand specialization, the problem of optimum price and optimum order quantity of supply chain are studied. The Stackelberg game problem is modeled in which the vendor is the first mover. Further more, we obtain the equilibrium solution, i.e. the optimum price which is under the control of the vendor and the optimum order quantity which is decided by the retailer. Finally, the difference between optimum decisions of normal goods and those of the goods in brand specialization is discussed with an example. Under brand Specialization, both the profits of supply chain and supplier＇ s share are increased.