摘要
世贸组织争端解决机制为各成员在遭受贸易损害时提供了三种解决方式:要求败诉方终止违法行为、败诉方自愿向申诉方提供补偿、授权申诉方中止对败诉方作出的关税减让承诺或其他义务。这些解决方式在实践中已暴露出诸多问题:终止违法行为的裁定由于败诉方的拒绝而无法执行,现行的补偿制度和报复措施又无法让一些申诉方得到及时、有效的救济。当申诉方是发展中国家成员时,上述问题就显得更加突出。如何通过完善争端解决机制中的补偿制度,最大限度地维护世贸组织各成员的权益,这是世贸组织各成员,特别是广大发展中国家成员在新一轮多边贸易谈判中需要重视的问题。
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism provides three remedies for its members suffering trade damage: suspension of offence made by the losing party, the losing party's voluntary compensation to complainant, and the complainant's suspension of Tariff reduction commitments or other obligations. However, those settlements are not desirable in practice in that the conviction of suspending violation cannot be fully implemented because of the refusal of the losing party, and that the complainant cannot get timely and effective relief owing to the current compensation system and retaliatory measures. The above problems will be more serious if the complainant is a developing country. What the WTO members, especially developing country members attach importance to in the new multilateral trade negotiations is to maximally protect the interests of the WTO members, and to provide safe and reliable safeguard for multilateral trade system by the dispute settlement mechanism through improvement of compensation system.
出处
《河南社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第1期117-120,共4页
Henan Social Sciences
关键词
争端解决
补偿
发展中国家
dispute settlement
compensation
developing country