外商对华污染转移的博弈分析

On Foreign Investment Pollution Transfer to China Based on Game Theory

文章从污染转移理论出发,在Nash谈判模型的基础上构建中外合资企业投资双方的合作博弈模型,指出跨国公司采取的污染产业规模变动的战略是在我国政府管制和市场发育既定条件下,基于跨国公司和我国企业双方谈判力大小而进行的主动决策。得出并进一步分析了跨国公司投资于发展中国家污染产业的三个基本命题,指出:只要外商将转移污染的成本控制在一定范围以内,其对华污染产业投资势必趋于扩大。最后,文章提出了相应的政策建议。

Based on the theory of pollution transfer and the Nash bargaining model, the paper constructs a cooperative game model in Sino - foreign joint venture and points out that the MNC strategy to transfer polluted industry to China is decided by the relative bargaining power of the two sides, under the restriction of Chinese government and the limitation of the market level. The inner motive of the transfer is also analyzed. The polluted industry will extend on the condition that the cost of pollution transfer is controlled under a certain level. The paper finally gives suggestions on the issue.