摘要
与个人投资者相比,机构投资者更接近有效市场假说中的"理性经济人"假设,但这是否就意味着行为金融学对EMH的诸多质疑在投资主体机构化的市场上就不再成立,市场将实现有效市场假说所描述的理想状态?本文系统分析投资者和投资经理之间的委托代理结构以及由此引发的道德风险、羊群行为和有限套利对提高市场信息效率的制约机制和消极影响,并对机构投资者实现市场有效性的三个减弱的假设提出了质疑。
Compared with individual investors,the assumption of rational investor is more applicable to institutional investors.However,does it mean that the financial market will become more efficient since institutional investors become the mainstream in the market?This paper fully analyzes the restriction mechanism and negative effect on improving the market information efficiency imposed by principal-agent structure be- tween investors and investment managers and the moral hazard,institutional herding and limited arbitrage arising in delegated investments.Based on this analysis,the paper questions the three efficiency-reducing assumptions about the role of institutional investors on market efficiency.
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第3期17-20,共4页
Finance & Trade Economics
