进场费的政府规制效果分析--基于权力范式的渠道研究

Result of Government's Regulating Slotting Allowances:A View of Power Paradigm

近年来,进场费问题始终是零售商与供应商矛盾冲突的焦点,也是理论界和政策制定者关注的热点。本文基于经济学研究的权力范式,构造了以政府规制强度为外生变量的供应商与零售商博弈模型,从理论上分析了进场费的作用及限制进场费对零售商、供应商的决策行为和消费者福利的影响。结论是:进场费作为渠道利益分配调节机制,客观上具有传递零售终端竞争压力的作用。限制进场费会减少零售商的利润,但不一定增加供应商的利润,且有可能削弱供应商改进产品的动机和刺激零售商扩张销售网络。

A synergic relationship exists between the manufactures and the retailers when providing products to consumers. The return of cooperation is total channel profits that equals to retail revenue minus producing costs. The profits were distributed among the producers and retailers according to the market power of each. The retailer＇s power derive from the populations occupied by them, while the supplier＇s power come from the function of their product. Both wholesale price and slotting fees can he used to divide channel profits. If wholesale price is too stable to express the power structure in the channel, slotting allowances will work as a adjusting mechanism that ensure the participants get the fraction assort with their strength. It transfers simultaneously competition from retail level to manufactures level un-purposely. When slotting fees were prohibited by governments, competition could not reach producer, hence result in a tardy transmission and little consumer surplus. Prohibiting allowance will whittle down retailer＇s profits hut not increase always producer＇s profits. From a view of long-terms, the prohibition will weaken the manufacture＇s impulsion of improvement product and stimulate retailers overspread their retail network.