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基于自我主体价值的行为公司治理理论 被引量:2

A Behavioral Corporate Governance Theory Based on Value of Agent's Principal Status
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摘要 本文首先提出并用实验检验了经济主体自我主体价值理论。实验结果显示,经济主体对自己有本能的认同和欣赏,具有自我主体价值感,从而表现出违反完全理性假定的行为特征。进而,本文创立了基于自我主体价值的行为公司治理理论,并运用该理论对公司治理中的代理问题(主体意识)、外部董事制度(主体无涉)、高管持股(主体融合)、家族企业治理(主体同一)、控制权之争(主体互斥)和政府控制(主体错位)等重要问题进行了一以贯之的分析。 This research paper first develops a new theory about the value of economic agent's principal status. Our experiment results demonstrate that economic agents own instinctive self-approval and self-appreciation, have the valuable sensation of principal status, and hence behave irrationally. Then, the paper proposes a behavioral corporate governance theory based on the value of economic agent's principal status, and theoretically analyzes agent's behavior in some hot issues, such as agency problem, function of outside directors system, family business governance, executive shareholding, struggle for control rights and state intervention.
作者 高雷 刘绪光
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第3期127-134,共8页 China Industrial Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金重点项目“中国公司治理及其评价研究”(批准号70532001) 国家社会科学基金项目“产品市场竞争对公司治理有效性影响的作用机理研究”(批准号07CJY001)
关键词 行为经济学 公司治理 行为公司治理 自我主体价值 behavior economics corporate governance behavior corporate governance value of principal status
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参考文献25

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二级参考文献132

共引文献1734

同被引文献59

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